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Abstract  
In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education 
affect economic growth by their influence on people’s health, abilities, skills and 
knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether 
welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary 
taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ 
from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 
OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for 
the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger 
for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure 
influences GDP growth more than private expenditure. 
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Resum 
En este trabajo se estudia cómo el gasto público y privado en sanidad y educación 
afectan el crecimiento económico a través de su influencia en la salud, las habilidades 
y el conocimiento de los individuos. Se considera un modelo de contabilidad del 
crecimiento para verificar si los beneficios de los gastos sociales compensan las 
pérdidas de eficiencia generadas por la imposición; y si los efectos del gasto público 
difieren de los efectos del gasto privado. El análisis empírico se basa en un panel de 
19 países de la OCDE estudiados entre el periodo de 1971 y 1998. Los resultados son 
consistentes con la hipótesis que afirma que la contribución del gasto social compensa 
las distorsiones causadas por los impuestos; y que el impacto positivo del gasto en 
sanidad es superior al observado para la educación. También se observa que el gasto 
público tiene un efecto superior sobre el crecimiento del PIB que el gasto privado. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Welfare State has been the subject of several discussions and reform proposals 
among scholars and politicians over the last thirty years. Political support has been 
declining recently, especially in Europe, where a great deal of resources are devoted 
to its funding. Following a standard neoclassical approach, many authors have argued 
that a reduction in the size of the Welfare State would stimulate economic growth. 
The usual argument is that distortionary taxes are needed to finance public 
intervention, which discourages entrepreneurship, capital and labour supply. Needless 
to say, this argument gains greater support whenever public intervention is perceived 
as inefficient, so individuals’ common belief is that everyone would be better off if 
the tax burden were reduced.1
 
However, as Atkinson (1995a, 1995b, 1999) suggests, the above argument is 
somewhat distorted, since it shows only one side of the coin. In fact, together with 
distortionary taxes, the Welfare State makes productive public expenditure available 
that might reasonably have a positive impact on people’s health, skills and knowledge 
and, through this channel, on economic growth. Naturally, not all public interventions 
traditionally included under the definition of the Welfare State have a positive effect 
on human health and abilities. Nevertheless, the provision of health and education at 
least should reasonably contribute to this end: a healthy and educated worker may be 
reasonably expected to be more productive than one who is uneducated and in poor 
health. As Streeten (1994) points out, “a well nourished healthy, educated, skilled, 
alert labour force is the most productive asset”.2 By considering both the loss arising 
from distortionary taxation and the benefits accruing to society through productive 
public expenditure, the overall effect of the Welfare State on economic growth is not 
theoretically obvious. 
 
                                                 
1 Another reason recently emphasised by the political economy literature to explain why the political 
climate has varied, focuses on the effects of skill biased technical change and the resulting increase in 
wage inequality, which determines a political equilibrium characterised by social preferences towards 
a downsizing of redistributive policies (e.g., Hassler et al., 2003). 
2 From Streeten’s perspective, societies should consume health and educational services regardless of 
their effect on economic growth: “... it is odd that Hondas, beer, and television sets are often accepted 
without questioning as final consumption goods, while nutrition, education, and health services have to 
be justified on grounds of productivity... The World Bank’s 1993 Development Report on health has 
the sub-title “Investing in Health” as if good health had to show economic returns higher than the cost 
of capital. What if the returns to investment in health are zero?”. 
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From a theoretical standpoint, the arguments mentioned above in favour or against 
the Welfare State are not even conclusive. For instance, Gintis and Bowles (1982) 
suggest that both the “human capital” approach and the standard neoclassical 
argument do not take the institutional aspects related to the Welfare State into 
account. From their perspective, the Welfare State guarantees positive and productive 
relations between capital and labour, thus shaping an economic and social 
environment in which private investments are stimulated. This argument is to some 
extent related to the concept of “social capital”, which has recently received 
considerable attention in the literature on the determinants of growth.3
 
The argument put forward by Gintis and Bowles implicitly maintains that a more 
equal distribution of resources favours output growth. This idea has gained theoretical 
foundations and empirical support over the last ten years, as can be seen by the papers 
by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994), among others.4 
These latter contributions provide empirical evidence that the more distribution of 
resources is unequal, the more investments in human and physical capital are 
discouraged, since it becomes more likely that governments will be called to 
implement policies that reduce the appropriability of the expected gains from such 
investments. It is worth noting that in addition to the standard textbook argument 
which builds on the presence of positive externalities, the positive relation between 
equality and growth mentioned above may also be used as a basis for justifying the 
public provision of goods such as health or education. In fact, it has been shown (see 
Balestrino, 1999, for a survey), that a more equal distribution of resources can be 
achieved more efficiently if the public provision of such goods is used by 
governments as well as (distortionary) tax instruments. 
 
By considering the discussion above, it can be seen that no definitive theoretical 
argument can be made in favour or against the Welfare State from a growth 
perspective. Its overall effect on economic performance should therefore be assessed 
on empirical grounds. However, this conclusion is not encouraging given the mixed 
results shown by the literature which has addressed the issue in this way (e.g., 
                                                 
3 For example, Knack and Keefer (1997), arguing that “trust and norms of civic cooperation are 
essential to well functioning societies and to the economic progress of those societies”, find measures 
of social capital that are positively related to economic growth. However, the concept of social capital 
is highly controversial, with the literature providing various definitions and measures (see Durlauf, 
2002, for a critical discussion).  
4 See also Putterman et al. (1998) for a critical survey. 
4  
Devarajan et al., 1996; Kneller et al., 1999; Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003, for a 
survey). 
 
A point that - quite surprisingly - has not been considered yet in the debate is that 
reducing public intervention would probably imply a higher allocation of goods such 
as health or education by means of private markets. However, the effect this could 
have on people’s health, skills and knowledge, is questionable, as substituting public 
with private provision might entail a level and a distribution of consumption of health 
and educational services that is sub-optimal from the social point of view. Moreover, 
as Gintis and Bowles (1982) point out, “the alternative to the Welfare State is … not 
simply less redistribution, but includes possible institutional transformation. The 
possible patterns of economic evolution consistent with the no-welfare-state option … 
include chaos, stagnation, and the development of new and perhaps unprecedented 
economic systems”. 
 
In this paper, we study how public and private expenditure in health and education 
affect economic growth as a result of their influence on people’s health, skills and 
knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework to explore an issue which is 
at the core of the academic and political debate on the Welfare State. We are 
particularly interested in ascertaining whether public welfare expenditures more than 
offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects 
of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed from 1971 
to 1998. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of public 
welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax 
system, and that the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for 
education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP 
growth to a greater extent than private expenditure.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we survey theoretical 
and empirical papers linking expenditure in health and education to economic growth. 
We make a distinction between the two concepts of “human development” and 
“human capital”, and discuss their proxies used in the empirical works. In section 3, 
we describe our empirical approach and our sample, and discuss our results. Section 4 
concludes this study. 
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2. Linking expenditure in health and education to economic growth 
 
The theoretical economic literature mentions several ways of linking expenditure in 
health and education to economic growth. Most of these links are related to the idea 
that a healthy and educated worker is expected to contribute more to production than 
one who is uneducated and in poor health. An initial strand of literature concentrates 
on human development, a concept introduced by Amartya Sen (e.g. Sen, 1987, 2000) 
and accepted by the United Nations Development Programme (1990) as a basis for 
the Human Development Report. The concept of human development is basically 
related to a person’s ability to enjoy achievements in welfare (e.g., Ranis, 2004, for a 
recent survey). This approach rightly acknowledges that the potential opportunities 
for healthy and educated workers, their abilities to function, are different from those 
of people who are uneducated and in poor health (Anand and Ravallion, 1993). A 
second interrelated strand of literature concentrates on human capital, which is a 
somewhat stricter concept since it refers only to the skills and knowledge that 
individuals acquire and which can be exploited in their role of workers in the labour 
market. Both these strands of the literature, despite their peculiarities, emphasize what 
may be called the “human factor” contribution to economic growth, and are 
consistent with two approaches. One of these works using a positive effect on labour 
productivity (the “Lucas approach”), while the other using through a positive impact 
on the rate of innovations (the “Nelson and Phelps approach”). Both these approaches 
can be formalised by considering an aggregate production function with the following 
general form: 
 ( )tttt ALKFY ,,=  (1) 
 
where Y is aggregate income, K is physical capital, L broadly represents workers, A is 
the level of technology, and t is an index for time. The “human factor” contribution to 
economic growth is embodied in either L or A. In the first case, L is usually dubbed as 
“effective units” of labour, while in the second case, A is split into two components, 
one of which is related to “pure technical change” and the other to “labour induced 
technical change”. 
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In terms of empirical strategies, there are at least two different methodologies for 
estimating the contribution of the “human factor” to economic growth. The first is 
based on an economic model of growth which takes exogenously given growth rates 
of the labour force and technology. This methodology provides an equation which 
links the aggregate product to the steady state values of the growth determinants (e.g., 
Mankiw et al., 1992). The second strategy is based on a growth accounting 
framework that - by assuming that the production factors are paid their marginal 
productivity - considers the GDP growth rate as a function of the inputs’ growth rates 
and output shares (e.g., Barro, 1998). Within this latter strategy, there are two further 
methods for estimating the contribution of the “human factor” to economic growth. 
The first is the traditional method based on the observed factor shares, and the second 
is based on regression analysis, where the factor shares represent the coefficients to 
be estimated. 
 
Since the choice of the proxy measure is severely constrained by data availability, it 
is not surprising that the variables used to account for the “human factor” – in both 
the human development and the human capital approaches - are to a large extent 
similar. In the human development approach, for instance, the Human Development 
Report (1990) combines three variables (life expectancy, adult literacy and command 
over resources needed for a decent living) to construct a human development index. 
Aturupane et al. (1994) also recommend a basic set of three indicators which covers 
the same general categories - infant mortality, primary school enrolment, and per 
capita income. Although the human development approach acknowledges the role of 
economic growth in enhancing the performance of the most commonly used 
indicators of human development, what really matters in this approach is not 
economic growth in itself, but the way in which its benefits are distributed among 
people and the extent to which growth supports public services (Anand and 
Ravallion, 1993). The conviction is that only those countries which devote an 
increasing amount of resources to these services (mainly health and education) may 
expect to move along a sustainable growth path. As Ranis (2004) puts it: “human 
development seems to be a necessary prerequisite for long-term sustainable growth ... 
the old-fashioned view of grow first and worry about human development later is not 
supported by the evidence”. 
 
As mentioned previously, the proxies used to account for the “human factor” within 
the human capital approach are basically the same. On the one hand, in their attempt 
to take into account the human capital within the standard neoclassical growth model, 
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Mankiw et al. (1992) proxy human capital with the percentage of the working age 
population enrolled in secondary school (explicitly ignoring the health status of the 
workers). Basing themselves on the same methodology provided by Mankiw et al. 
(1992), Knowles and Owen (1997) and Webber (2002) consider a more complex 
measurement of human capital, which tries to include both the health status and the 
educational level of the workforce. Knowles and Owen (1997) use life expectancy as 
a proxy for health status, and the average numbers of years of schooling attained by 
the population aged over 25 as a proxy for educational achievement. Webber (2002) 
proxies education with three different measures (namely the percentage of the 
relevant population enrolled in primary, secondary and higher school) and uses an 
index of under-nutrition based on calorie intake as a proxy for the health status.5 On 
the other hand, within the growth accounting strategy, Bloom et al. (2001) model 
human capital using a non-linear combination of three terms. These are schooling 
(measured as the average total years of schooling of the population aged 15 years and 
older), aggregate work experience (measured as the amount of time spent in the 
labour force), and health (proxied by life expectancy), whereas Herbertsson (2003) 
obtains the factor share that remunerates human capital by the estimation of a 
structural model, in which the externality produced by public spending in education 
affects human capital with a certain lag.6
 
In more general terms, Le et al. (2003) and Wößmann (2003), in their surveys on the 
most commonly used proxies for human capital, classify these measures into three 
broad approaches - a cost-based approach; an income-based approach, and an 
educational stock-based approach. The cost-based approach basically proxies the 
human capital stock by considering both the costs of producing the physical human 
being (in other words, the costs of rearing a child) and the costs of increasing labour 
productivity (e.g. expenditures in health and education). The income-based approach 
measures human capital by considering the total income that could be generated by an 
                                                 
5 The results concerning the link between human capital accumulation and economic growth are 
mixed. Knowles and Owen (1997), using a cross-section of 77 countries selected from those 
considered by Mankiw et al. (1992), find a strong positive relationship between health status and 
economic growth, whereas the relationship between economic growth and education is found to be not 
significant. By contrast, Webber (2002) finds that education is consistently more important than health 
in stimulating economic growth in a cross-section of 46 countries, 26 of which are classified by the 
World Bank as low- or middle-income countries. 
6 As before, the results are somewhat mixed. Bloom et al. (2001), using data for a panel of countries 
from the Penn World Tables, find a positive impact by health on economic growth, whereas no 
clearcut results for schooling and experience are found. Herbertsson (2003), considering data for five 
Nordic European countries, finds that human capital makes a contribution of between 12 and 33% to 
explaining economic growth. 
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individual during her lifetime. Finally, the educational stock-based approach 
considers the educational attainment of the labour force (i.e. the average years of 
schooling or the adult literacy rates). Since we are interested in assessing the 
contribution of the welfare expenditure (both public and private) to economic growth, 
we work here within a cost-based approach. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
In this section, we describe our empirical methodology, grounded on a cost-based 
approach to the measurement of the contribution of the “human factor” to economic 
growth. The key point we wish to stress is that we model the “human factor” as a 
function of total (i.e. public and private) expenditure in health and education. In other 
words, the “human factor” stems from the consumption of educational and health 
services. In particular, like Grossman (1972), we model the differences between 
health capital and other forms of human capital, by assuming that only current 
consumption of health services influences health status, whereas current and past 
consumption of educational services influence the amount of knowledge. Like all the 
other proxies, our cost-based type measure is also subject to some criticism. For 
example, Hanushek (1996) argues that expenditure in education cannot be considered 
consistently linked to acquired cognitive skill. In a similar vein, Le et al. (2003) point 
out that “there is no necessary relationship between investment and quality of output 
... an innately less able and less healthy child is more costly to raise”. However, our 
choice can be justified on different grounds. To begin with, as Wößmann (2003) has 
also recently clarified, all the most commonly used measures of human capital (or 
human development) are inevitably imperfect and (more importantly) linked to data 
availability. Moreover, contrary to the above mentioned view, there is a growing 
body of empirical evidence supporting a causal relationship between expenditure on 
health care (education) and health status (education attainment) (e.g., Gupta et al., 
2002). Furthermore, this correlation is found to increase with the quality of 
governance (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002). This may raise the doubt that the 
correlations between most of the commonly used measures of human capital or 
human development (e.g. adult literacy, life expectancy, school enrolment ratios) and 
output growth are spurious. These variables may indeed be correlated with 
expenditure in health or education, and expenditure may have a genuine causal 
relationship with growth. Finally, expenditure must necessarily be correlated with the 
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internal rate of return of investments (IRR) in health and education, which constitutes 
the basis for deriving a Mincer formulation to specify human capital stock. In fact, 
assuming that choices are rationally taken by individuals, the IRR equals costs and 
benefits of investments (e.g., Wößmann, 2003), hence total spending in health and 
education can be obtained by capitalising annual benefits with the IRR. 
 
Our empirical analysis considers both private and public expenditure in health and 
education. There are at least four arguments suggesting differences between the 
effects of the two types of expenditure. The first argument rests on the answer given 
to the question of whether private and public expenditure should be considered 
substitutes or complements. In the former case, public provision may simply crowd 
out private expenditure. As Filmer et al. (2000) point out, “changes in the price or 
availability of government interventions may induce a private supply response that 
can mitigate any actual impact on health outcomes”. In the latter case, private 
expenditure can simply be thought of as topping up public expenditure, therefore 
being less productive if diminishing returns to health and education are assumed. A 
second argument is that public intervention takes the presence of positive externalities 
in consumption of health and education into account, whereas private markets 
typically do not. Since the distribution of consumption of these goods among 
individuals would be different with private provision, a third argument is that the 
overall effect on the “human factor” may significantly diverge, depending on the 
relative composition of total spending. A fourth and final argument is related to the 
fact that public intervention could contribute to improving the social environment 
(e.g. Gradstein and Justman, 2000). Previous contributions generally considered 
public expenditure in isolation, or considered either expenditure in health or 
expenditure in education. Unlike these approaches, we consider both public and 
private expenditure. To the best of our knowledge, this point has never been 
considered before. 
 
For our purposes, let us start by differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to time. Dividing 
by Y yields: 
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and assuming each input is paid its marginal product, we obtain: 
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Note that SA is not observable, and therefore we cannot directly measure the 
contribution of technology to output because it cannot be separated from the 
contributions of physical capital and (broadly defined) labour. The reason for this is 
that the observed factor shares of physical capital and labour also include the 
remuneration of technology and the contribution of the “human factor” to economic 
growth (see also Besley, 2001). Following this rationale, Eq. (3) can be rewritten - 
assuming constant returns to scale at the aggregate level - as: 
 
A
A
L
L
K
K
Y
Y
LK
∆+∆+∆=∆ σσ , (4) 
 
where σK and σL are the observed factor shares of physical capital and labour 
respectively. 
 
We now need to define the link between the “human factor” and output growth rate. 
Let us first follow the “Lucas approach” and assume that expenditure in health and 
education contributes to define effective units of labour L* as follows: 
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where L is the number of workers, HE and E are expenditure in health and in 
education respectively, pu and pr are mnemonics for public and private, and I 
represents the institutional features which may be relevant to explain differences in 
the quality and the efficiency of these two types of expenditure (e.g. whether such 
goods are provided at the central or at the local level, or whether there is any 
competition between public and private suppliers). Considering the definition of 
effective units of labour given in Eq. (5) and substituting in Eq. (4), the equation to be 
estimated can be written as: 
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where λi and φt are country and time fixed effects respectively, and εit represents a 
standard error term. The time effect φt includes all those influences on the output 
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growth rate common to all countries in a given year (e.g. the economic cycle), while 
the individual effect λi picks up the influences specific to each country (e.g. social, 
religious, climate or geographical factors). λi and φt provide also an additional control 
for the institutional differences outlined above. 
 
An alternative way of reaching Eq. (6) follows the “Nelson and Phelps approach”, 
and models the “human factor” using efficiency parameter A. In particular, we 
assume that the efficiency parameter is a function of the technology TE and the labour 
productivity LP; hence: 
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In other words, as before, labour productivity stems from the consumption of 
educational and health services. Considering Eq. (5 b), and substituting in Eq. (4), we 
are then back again to Eq. (6). 
 
3.2. Data 
 
In order to empirically estimate Eq. (6), we use annual data on a per capita basis from 
a sample of 19 OECD countries during the period 1971-1998.7 Data on 
macroeconomic variables come from the Penn World Tables 6.1, and include data on 
population, real GDP per capita at constant prices8 (GDP) and the investment share of 
GDP. The labour force in each country was obtained from OECD Health Data. We 
have constructed a measure of private capital stock for each country using a perpetual 
inventory method. We initialise the capital stock series setting the capital stock in 
1971 equal to the average investment/GDP ratio in the first five years of data, 
multiplied by the level of GDP in the initialising period, and divided by 0.07, our 
assumed depreciation rate (Bloom et al., 2001). The capital stock of each subsequent 
period is calculated using current capital plus the level of current investment, minus 
the 7% depreciation rate of the current stock. Health expenditure (HE) is measured by 
using data on public and private spending on health per capita expressed in 
international PPP dollars from the OECD Health Data. Similarly, we measure 
education expenditure (EDU) using data on public and private spending on education 
                                                 
7Due to data availability, especially for the data about expenditure in education, we have selected a 
sample of OECD countries for which we were able to obtain annual series of the variables used in this 
work.  
8 Constant price values of GDP are calculated using a Laspeyres index. 
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per capita. However, data on education spending are difficult to obtain for a long time 
span. As a result, we are forced to consider only current expenditure in education. In 
order to partially overcome this problem and check the robustness of our results, we 
use two data sources for public expenditure in education. These are the data published 
by UNESCO and the data from the World Bank database. Finally, the data on private 
spending in education (covering all levels of education) are from OECD Education at 
a Glance. We also include additional controls for institutional aspects that might 
influence the effectiveness and the estimated role of spending in different countries. 
Data on income inequality as measured by the Gini index (GINI) comes from 
Deininger and Squire (1996). Political variables are taken from DPI2000 (Keefer, 
2002), and include: a dummy variable equal to one where Central Government is 
supported by left-wing parties (EXECRLC), a variable measuring the fraction of seats 
held by the Government (MAJ) and a dummy variable equal to one in the years of 
legislative elections (LEGELEC). Data on the degree of fiscal decentralisation, 
measuring the percentage of taxes collected by the Central Government (CGTAX), 
are obtained from the OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2002. The descriptive statistics 
and data sources for all the variables included in our empirical analysis are reported in 
Appendix 1. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. The main problem is 
the lack of data for private expenditure on education, which shortens the time span 
and reduces the sample of countries, making it difficult to identify the parameters of 
interest. We therefore start by considering only public and private expenditure on 
health. We then augment our basic estimation by adding public expenditure on 
education and, finally, by including private expenditure.9 As an additional robustness 
test, we also consider a regression only with expenditure in education. 
 
Table 1 shows our estimates when expenditure in health is considered in isolation. 
The Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman (1978) test indicate that the 2-way REM is 
the preferred model. As expected, most of the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. The coefficient associated 
with physical capital is significantly greater than that associated with labour. This 
result holds for all our models and is at odds with findings by Bloom et al. (2001). In 
                                                 
9 See the table notes for the definition of the sample of countries and the time span used in each group 
of estimations. 
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column I, the coefficient for total health expenditure is 0.0574: a 1% increase in the 
HEtot growth rate increases the per-capita GDP growth rate by 0.06%. In column II, 
we test whether the coefficients associated with public and private expenditure differ. 
Results show that the coefficients for the two types of expenditure do have a different 
magnitude, with the coefficient associated with public expenditure greater than that of 
private expenditure and statistically significant. Columns III and IV suggest that these 
two coefficients are robust and well identified. It is worth noting that, as pointed out 
by Kneller et al. (1999), our estimates of the effects of public spending on GDP 
growth should suffer from a downward bias caused by the omission of distortionary 
taxation. For this reason, our conclusions on the positive impact of public expenditure 
should then be reinforced. We provide an initial test of the robustness of our findings 
by adding additional controls for different institutional features to previous 
regressions. The results for these augmented models are shown in table 2. The main 
findings are confirmed - the coefficient for total health expenditure is now 0.0607, i.e. 
very close to that previously estimated, and disaggregating public and private 
expenditure yields coefficients of approximately the same magnitude as before. All of 
the coefficients for the political variables are statistically insignificant. Only the 
coefficient for CGTAX appears as marginally insignificant at the usual levels. 
 
Table 3 reports our estimates when augmenting the first set of regressions by also 
considering public expenditure in education. The Breusch-Pagan test and the 
Hausman test now indicate that the 2-way FEM is the preferred model. While the 
coefficient for physical capital remains unaltered, the one for labour is reduced and is 
statistically insignificant. However, results show an increase in the magnitude of the 
coefficients on public and private expenditure in health, with both coefficients are 
now statistically significant. The coefficient for public expenditure in education also 
shows the expected sign and is statistically significant. According to these results, 
public expenditure in health seems to have a greater impact on economic growth than 
public expenditure on education. This result matches the findings of Knowles and 
Owen (1997). The results are robust for the two variables of public spending on 
education used (UNESCO and World Bank), with an elasticity of around 2-3%. In 
this case, we also repeat our exercise by including political variables (table 4). As 
before, all the main results are confirmed. 
 
We obtain much less firm results when augmenting previous regressions further by 
adding private expenditure in education (table 5). The estimated coefficient for 
physical capital rises sharply compared to previous estimates. A somewhat surprising 
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result is that the coefficient for labour is now negative (although not statistically 
significant) in almost all estimations. Coefficients on health and education 
expenditure also appear difficult to identify, and are even negative (but statistically 
not significant) in some regressions. These conclusions are confirmed when political 
variables are also added (table 6), and when both public and private expenditure on 
education is considered in isolation, (table 7 and 8). One possible explanation for 
these findings may be that the final sample is rather small (almost 60 observations), 
with only 9 countries included and a very short time span. 
 
One possible criticism of our findings relates to the problems of endogeneity and 
reverse causality. In fact, a well documented stylised fact is that (total) expenditure in 
health and education rises with per-capita GDP. Empirical papers trying to address 
the direction of causality between the Welfare State and economic growth (e.g. Herce 
et al., 2001) found inconclusive evidence. We do not address this issue here, and 
concentrate instead on endogeneity. In order to cope with this problem, we consider 
the instrumental variable estimation of our previous model, using the GMM 
estimator. Table 9 shows the GMM estimates. To control for fixed effects, the 
variables are transformed in terms of orthogonal deviations, and a full set of time 
dummies is included in the regression to account for factors varying over time but 
which are common to all units. We report results based on consistent one-step 
estimators, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),. We use the lagged values (t-1 
up to t-3) of the health expenditure variables as instruments. We also include the Gini 
index as an additional instrument in the dynamic IV estimations. We check for the 
validity of instruments using the Sargan test. Given that the GMM estimator uses 
lagged values of the variables as instruments, under the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation in the error term, the series of differentiated residuals should present a 
significant first-order correlation, while indication of second-order serial correlation 
should not be present. We provide two statistics, m1 and m2, that test for first and 
second-order serial correlation in the error term, respectively. As expected, m1 is 
statistically significant, while m2 is not, thus confirming the validity of instruments. 
We also test whether there is any dynamic structure in our model, by introducing 
lagged values of the GDP growth rate and the spending variables as regressors. Our 
main results are substantially unchanged with respect to our previous estimates in 
table 1. The magnitude of the coefficients associated to labour and health spending 
increase, with coefficients for HEtot being now close to 0.10. In this case, the 
effectiveness of public expenditure on economic growth also appears larger than that 
of private expenditure. The same type of results holds true in the dynamic version of 
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our model, which provides an additional robustness check for our results. The 
coefficient for lagged health expenditure is significant only when considering total 
expenditure, suggesting that only current consumption of health services matters for 
economic growth. 
 
In order to study the role of spending in health and education in contributing to 
economic growth further, we decompose the GDP average growth rate at its sources, 
using the accounting methodology detailed in Herbertsson (2003). We limit ourselves 
to the estimates reported in tables 1 and 3. Results of these exercises are shown in 
tables 10 and 11. In both cases, half of the reported GDP growth rate is explained by 
growth in the stock of physical capital. The role of spending on health is significantly 
higher than that on education, with the former accounting for between 16.44% and 
27.30% of economic growth, with much of this result coming from the contribution 
by public expenditure. The share of GDP growth accounted for by education 
expenditure is around 3%, a contribution similar to that by labour once we account 
for the role of human capital. The TFP component related to pure technological 
change contributes between 17.59% and 42.58%. Our results are substantially in 
agreement with findings by Herbertsson (2003). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we provide an initial attempt to explore issues that should be placed at 
the core of the ongoing academic and political debate concerning the Welfare State. Is 
there any evidence that countries which devote a larger amount of resources to the 
consumption of health and educational services experience higher growth rates? Is 
there any difference between public and private expenditure in health and education? 
Are the gains accruing to societies because of public welfare expenditures able to 
offset the efficiency losses caused by the distortionary taxes necessary to fund the 
Welfare State? From a theoretical standpoint, we have emphasized the role that 
expenditure in health and education plays in enhancing what we have called the 
“human factor”, which affects economic growth via either labour productivity or 
technical progress. Our empirical analysis, based on a panel of 19 OECD countries 
observed from 1971 to 1998, shows a robust positive correlation between expenditure 
in health and education and GDP growth. The estimated positive impact is stronger 
for health than for education. There is also some evidence that public expenditure 
influences GDP growth to a greater extent than private expenditure. All these results 
also appear to be robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of welfare 
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expenditures. A simple accounting exercise shows that the contribution to GDP 
growth of spending on health is significantly greater than that of education, with the 
former accounting for between 16.44% and 27.30% and the latter accounting for 
about 3% of economic growth. 
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Table 1. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Health Spending (Public and Private) 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Constant 0.0085 (2.517)**
0.0092 
(2.740)***
0.0102 
(3.217)***
0.0118 
(3.982)***
Capital 0.7696 (9.194)***
0.7787 
(9.234)***
0.7807 
(9.370)***
0.8066 
(9.282)***
Labour 0.1436 (2.688)***
0.1391 
(2.585)***
0.1384 
(2.589)***
0.1421 
(2.646)***
HEtot 0.0574 (2.208)** --.-- --.-- --.-- 
HEpu --.-- 0.0392 (1.749)*
0.0327 
(1.480) --.-- 
HEpr --.-- 0.0078 (1.164) --.-- 
0.0074 
(1.104) 
N (par) 365 (4) 365 (5) 369 (4) 371 (4) 
R2 28.12 28.17 27.96 27.87 
B-P (LM) 110.21*** 108.93*** 100.84*** 114.83***
Hausman 3.55 [0.3140] 
2.93 
[0.5696] 
3.17 
[0.3659] 
0.74 
[0.8646] 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations performed 
with individual and time random effects (2-way REM model). Results obtained 
using White robust standard errors. Sample of OECD countries used (18): 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
and US (the number of observations, N, differs because some series are 
unbalanced). Time span: 1971-1998. High values of the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test 
favour FEM/REM over the Pooled Estimator (OLS). High (low) values of the 
Hausman test favour FEM (REM). 
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Table 2. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Health Spending (Public and Private) and Institutional Variables. 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Constant 0.0069 (0.566) 
0.0099 
(0.761) 
0.0090 
(0.711) 
0.0088 
(0.701) 
Capital 0.7749 (8.933)***
0.7848 
(8.952)***
0.7870 
(9.81)***
0.8141 
(9.524)***
Labour 0.1422 (2.648)***
0.1378 
(2.544)**
0.1364 
(2.536)**
0.1399 
(2.590)***
HEtot 0.0607 (2.309)** --.-- --.-- --.-- 
HEpu --.-- 0.04254 (1.876)*
0.0357 
(1.589) --.-- 
HEpr --.-- 0.0082 (1.220) --.-- 
0.0076 
(1.128) 
GINI -0.0003 (-1.016) 
-0.0003 
(-0.971) 
-0.0003 
(-0.985) 
-0.0001 
(-0.325) 
EXECRLC -0.0003 (-0.159) 
-0.0004 
(-0.182) 
-0.0002 
(-0.092) 
-0.0000 
(-0.034) 
MAJ 0.0100 (0.895) 
0.0096 
(0.846) 
0.0095 
(0.852) 
0.0096 
(0.858) 
LEGEL -0.0025 (-1.163) 
-0.0026 
(-1.186) 
-0.0021 
(-0.986) 
-0.0022 
(-1.021) 
CGTAX 0.0121 (1.395) 
0.0120 
(1.323) 
0.0115 
(1.297) 
0.0122 
(1.372) 
N (par) 364 (9) 364 (9) 368 (9) 370 (9) 
R2 29.35 29.41 29.13 29.05 
B-P (LM) 116.54*** 115.78*** 105.99*** 119.5524***
Hausman 6.90 [0.5479] 
5.86 
[0.7541] 
6.75 
[0.5638] 
4.28 
[0.8306] 
Notes: see table 1. 
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Table 3. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Health Spending (Public and Private) and Education Spending (Public) 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way FEM using LSDV 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Constant 0.0055 (1.754)*
0.0075 
(2.551)**
0.0049 
(1.321) 
0.0055 
(1.621) 
0.0072 
(2.462)**
Capital 0.8599 (6.533)***
0.8719 
(6.609)***
0.8146 
(6.194)***
0.8188 
(6.247)***
0.8318 
(6.373)***
Labour 0.0693 (0.765) 
0.0467 
(0.511) 
0.0726 
(0.796) 
0.0505 
(0.551) 
0.0425 
(0.465) 
HEtot 0.0832 (2.665)*** --.-- 
0.0938 
(2.327)** --.-- --.-- 
HEpu --.-- 0.0592 (2.128)** --.-- 
0.0772 
(2.625)***
0.0679 
(2.422)**
HEpr --.-- 0.0018 (1.895)* --.-- 
0.0125 
(1.045) --.-- 
EDUpub(WB) ---.-- --.-- 0.0299 (2.248)**
0.0293 
(2.207)**
0.0292 
(2.193)**
N (par) 240 (34) 240 (35) 220 (35) 220 (36) 220 (35) 
R2 52.07 52.06 57.10 57.45 57.20 
B-P (LM) 87.21*** 83.77*** 95.72*** 98.48*** 99.53***
Hausman 11.35 [0.0099] 
10.68 
[0.0303] 
10.15 
[0.0379] 
16.13 
[0.0064] 
12.36 
[0.0148] 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 
5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations performed with individual and time dummies (2-
way FEM model). Results obtained using White robust standard errors. Sample of OECD 
countries used (16): Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US (the 
number of observations, N, differ because some series are unbalanced). Time span: 1980-1995. 
High values of the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test favour FEM/REM over the Pooled Estimator (OLS). 
High (low) values of the Hausman test favour FEM (REM). We performed the same estimations 
as the ones shown in table 3 with data on public spending in education from UNESCO. The main 
results (not reported but available upon request) do not change much from the ones presented in 
table 3. The estimated elasticity for public spending on education is around 2% in all the models. 
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Table 4. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Health Spending (Public and Private), Education Spending (Public)  
and Institutional Variables. 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) 
Constant 0.0060 (0.352) 
0.0062 
(0.351) 
0.0113 
(0.605) 
0.0098 
(0.487) 
0.0140 
(0.751) 
Capital 0.7965 (6.721)***
0.8199 
(6.775)***
0.8006 
(6.573)***
0.8081 
(6.513)***
0.8207 
(6.800)***
Labour 0.0817 (0.915) 
0.0614 
(0.675) 
0.0904 
(0.643) 
0.0395 
(0.429) 
0.0381 
(0.420) 
HEtot 0.0841 (2.647)** --.-- 
0.0901 
(2.218)** --.-- --.-- 
HEpu --.-- 0.0535 (1.778)* --.-- 
0.0723 
(2.290)**
0.0650 
(2.114)**
HEpr --.-- 0.0019 (2.040)** --.-- 
0.0125 
(0.992) --.-- 
EDUpub(WB) --.-- --.-- 0.0283 (2.095)**
0.0279 
(2.047)**
0.02784 
(2.048)**
GINI -0.0003 (-0.825) 
-0.0003 
(-0.721) 
-0.0003 
(-0.730) 
-0.0002 
(-0.538) 
-0.0003 
(-0.792) 
EXECRLC -0.0001 (-0.057) 
-0.0001 
(-0.052) 
-0.0017 
(-0.513) 
-0.0018 
(-0.519) 
-0.0013 
(-0.409) 
MAJ 0.0010 (0.064) 
0.0029 
(0.180) 
-0.0136 
(-0.745) 
-0.0130 
(-0.639) 
-0.0137 
(-0.756) 
LEGEL -0.0022 (-0.743) 
-0.0023 
(-0.773) 
-0.0019 
(-0.634) 
-0.0020 
(-0.681) 
-0.0019 
(-0.642) 
CGTAX 0.0209 (1.531) 
0.0207 
(1.425) 
0.0229 
(1.534) 
0.0220 
(1.329) 
0.0234 
(1.568) 
N (par) 225 (9) 225 (10) 205 (10) 205 (11) 205 (10) 
R2 26.27 26.60 28.05 28.02 28.02 
B-P (LM) 76.97*** 74.43*** 86.51*** 89.11*** 89.82***
Hausman 8.28 [0.4064] 
6.45 
[0.6939] 
8.73 
[0.4630] 
8.38 
[0.5913] 
7.51 
[0.5845] 
Notes: see table 3. 
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Table 5. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Health and Education Spending (Public and Private) 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Constant 0.0063 (0.745) 
0.0070 
(0.579) 
0.0128 
(1.483) 
0.0051 
(0.565) 
Capital 0.9714 (3.753)***
1.3533 
(3.837)***
1.2673 
(4.207)***
1.0878 
(4.213)***
Labour -0.0497 (-0.156) 
-0.2094 
(-0.634) 
-0.2323 
(-0.688) 
0.0021 
(0.007) 
HEtot 0.0750 (0.895) --.-- --.-- --.-- 
HEpu --.-- -0.08104 (-1.041) 
-0.0773 
(-1.016) --.-- 
HEpr --.-- 0.0649 (1.372) --.-- 
0.0862 
(1.841)*
EDUtot(WB) 0.0809 (1.606) --.-- --.-- --.-- 
EDUpub(WB) --.-- 0.0685 (2.376)**
0.0688 
(2.397)** --.-- 
EDUpriv(WB) --.-- 0.0009 (0.213) --.-- 
0.0002 
(0.042) 
N (par) 55 (5) 55 (7) 55 (5) 55 (5) 
R2 50.39 54.75 50.71 49.56 
B-P (LM) 4.37* 9.80*** 14.91*** 4.44*
Hausman 4.97 [0.2906] 
5.22 
[0.5155] 
5.71 
[0.2219] 
2.91 
[0.5722] 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent level, respectively. Estimations performed with 
random individual and time effects (2-way REM model). Results obtained using 
White robust standard errors. Sample of OECD countries used (9): Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and US (the number of 
observations, N, differ because some series are unbalanced). Time span: 1991-1998. 
High values of the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test favour FEM/REM over the Pooled 
Estimator (OLS). High (low) values of the Hausman test favour FEM (REM). 
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Table 6. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Health and Education Spending (Public and Private)  
and Institutional Variables 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Constant 0.0086 (0.276) 
-0.0048 
(-0.139) 
0.0052 
(0.161) 
-0.0100 
(-0.288) 
Capital 0.9031 (3.353)***
1.2398 
(3.972)***
1.2091 
(3.963)***
0.9542 
(3.394)***
Labour -0.2644 (-0.788) 
-0.2769 
(-0.792) 
-0.2796 
(-0.810) 
-0.1727 
(-0.495) 
HEtot 0.0324 (0.380) --.-- --.-- --.-- 
HEpu --.-- -0.0957 (-1.201) 
-0.1026 
(-1.290) --.-- 
HEpr --.-- 0.0517 (1.044) --.-- 
0.0729 
(1.483) 
EDUtot(WB) 0.0894 (1.777)* --.-- --.-- --.-- 
EDUpub(WB) --.-- 0.0652 (2.194)**
0.0691 
(2.372)** --.-- 
EDUpriv(WB) --.-- 0.0007 (0.171) --.-- 
0.0003 
(0.071) 
GINI -0.0004 (-0.508) 
0.0001 
(0.128) 
-0.0001 
(-0.035) 
-0.0001 
(-0.061) 
MAJ -0.0131 (-0.440) 
-0.0050 
(-0.157) 
-0.0093 
(-0.299) 
-0.0049 
(-0.157) 
LEGEL -0.0069 (-1.310) 
-0.0052 
(-0.901) 
-0.0067 
(-1.191) 
-0.0039 
(-0.781) 
CGTAX 0.0485 (1.933)*
0.0306 
(1.046) 
0.0306 
(1.249) 
0.0460 
(1.644) 
N (par) 55 (9) 55 (8) 55 (9) 55 (6) 
R2 54.76 56.87 52.60 54.31 
B-P (LM) 10.14*** 9.15** 15.84*** 7.57**
Hausman 8.73 [0.3651] 
9.58 
[0.4781] 
8.24 
[0.4100] 
6.05 
[0.6418] 
Notes: see table 5. 
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Table 7. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Education Spending (Public and Private) 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Constant 0.0088 (1.372) 
0.0100 
(1.198) 
0.0098 
(1.231) 
0.00972 
(1.398) 
Capital 1.0411 (4.400)***
1.1701 
(4.073)***
1.1781 
(4.165)***
1.0532 
(4.275)***
Labour -0.0040 (-0.013) 
-0.2151 
(-0.629) 
-0.2082 
(-0.618) 
0.0476 
(0.151) 
EDUtot(WB) 0.0816 (1.661)* --.-- --.-- --.-- 
EDUpub(WB) --.-- 0.0691 (2.366)**
0.0689 
(2.396)** --.-- 
EDUpriv(WB) --.-- -0.0001 (-0.042) --.-- 
-0.0001 
(-0.138) 
N (par) 62 (4) 55 (5) 55 (4) 55 (4) 
R2 49.94 51.16 50.62 46.27 
B-P (LM) 4.14* 12.24*** 14.04*** 5.48*
Hausman 5.91 [0.1161] 
6.03 
[0.1972] 
5.35 
[0.1480] 
3.74 
[0.2912] 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis and p-values in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimations performed with 
random individual and time effects (2-way REM model). Results obtained using 
White robust standard errors. Sample of OECD countries used (9): Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and US (the number of 
observations, N, differ because some series are unbalanced). Time span: 1991-1998. 
High values of the Breusch-Pagan (LM) test favour FEM/REM over the Pooled 
Estimator (OLS). High (low) values of the Hausman test favour FEM (REM). Results 
using spending on education from OECD show coefficients around 8-10% for the 
public spending variable while for private spending we obtain positive elasticities 
around 1.5%, although these are not statistically significant. 
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Table 8. Production Function in Growth Form. 
Education Spending (Public and Private) and Institutional Variables 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP; 2-way REM using GLS 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Constant 0.0099 (0.334) 
0.0009 
(0.039) 
0.0089 
(0.280) 
0.0027 
(0.087) 
Capital 0.9301 (3.634)***
1.0753 
(3.671)***
1.0813 
(3.690)***
0.9276 
(3.414)***
Labour -0.2648 (-0.803) 
-0.2712 
(-0.771) 
-0.2823 
(-0.803) 
-0.1832 
(-0.524) 
EDUtot(WB) 0.0883 (1.779)* --.-- --.-- --.-- 
EDUpub(WB) --.-- 0.0683 (2.276)**
0.0690 
(2.322)** --.-- 
EDUpriv(WB) --.-- 0.0005 (0.111) --.-- 
-0.0001 
(-0.031) 
GINI -0.0004 (-0.540) --.-- 
-0.0002 
(-0.253) 
-0.0002 
(-0.293) 
MAJ -0.0135 (-0.466) 
-0.0082 
(-0.258) 
-0.0082 
(-0.258) 
-0.0098 
(-0.317) 
LEGEL -0.0073 (-1.421) 
-0.0059 
(-1.031) 
-0.0059 
(-1.039) 
-0.0058 
(-1.065) 
CGTAX 0.0495 (2.073)**
0.0319 
(1.242) 
0.0347 
(1.260) 
0.0491 
(1.964)**
N (par) 63 (8) 55 (8) 55 (8) 55 (8) 
R2 54.70 52.98 52.47 51.36 
B-P (LM) 10.31*** 12.72*** 14.61*** 10.30***
Hausman 9.01 [0.2519] 
6.69 
[0.4613] 
7.07 
[0.4221] 
5.46 
[0.6038] 
Notes: see table 7. 
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Table 9. Instrumental Variables: Health Spending. Dependent variable: Growth Rate GDP. 1-step GMM estimation 
Variables Static IV estimation Dynamic IV estimation 
Constant 0.0008 (0.193) 
0.0019 
(0.466) 
0.0061 
(1.53) 
0.0015 
(0.399) 
0.0073 
(1.78)*
0.0039 
(1.08) 
0.0270 
(5.45)***
0.0062 
(1.53) 
g-GDP (-1) --.--    --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.0652 (0.311) 
-0.1048 
(-0.563) 
-0.0190 
(-0.111) 
-0.0201 
(-0.138) 
Capital 0.7829 (2.37)**
0.6882 
(2.02)**
0.9755 
(3.46)***
0.8063 
(3.78)***
0.7984 
(1.86)*
0.7582 
(2.05)**
0.7185 
(3.99)***
0.8172 
(3.10)***
Labour 0.1071 (0.836) 
0.2114 
(1.31) 
0.2852 
(3.51)***
0.2015 
(3.10)***
0.1087 
(0.927) 
0.2504 
(1.55) 
0.2119 
(1.93)*
0.2195 
(3.31)***
HEtot 0.1042 (6.13)*** --.--      --.-- --.--
0.0983 
(5.91)*** --.-- --.-- --.--
HEtot(-1) --.--       --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.0600 (-1.71)* --.-- --.-- --.--
HEpu --.-- 0.0697 (4.15)*** --.-- 
0.0720 
(4.42)*** --.-- 
0.0718 
(3.58)*** --.-- 
0.0707 
(3.85)***
HEpu(-1)      --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.0116 (0.300) --.-- 
-0.0084 
(-0.208) 
HEpr --.--    --.-- 0.0081 (1.92)*
0.0095 
(2.91)*** --.-- --.--
0.0080 
(0.857) 
0.0144 
(1.99)**
HEpr(-1)       --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.0136 (-1.39) 
-0.0063 
(-0.803) 
N (par) 347 (23) 351 (23) 353 (23) 347 (24) 328 (24) 332 (24) 352 (25) 328 (26) 
RSS 0.11359        0.11493 0.1201 0.11400 0.10840 0.11328 0.12063 0.10989
Sargan (df) 61.01 (54) [0.239] 
58.02 (54) 
[0.329] 
55.39 (54) 
[0.422] 
121.6 (110) 
[0.212] 
58.20 (51) 
[0.228] 
53.86 (51) 
[0.365] 
44.55 (71) 
[0.994] 
113.8 (105) 
[0.263] 
m1 -2.238** -2.399** -2.428** -2.329** -2.282** -2.006** -2.332** -2.898***
m2 -0.266        -0.075 -0.222 -0.267 0.3983 0.747 0.1681 0.044
Notes: t-ratios in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. *, ** and *** indicates significativity of estimated parameters at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance, respectively. Instruments: lagged values (t-1 up to t-3) of the health spending variables; in the third column in the 
dynamic IV estimation we also include the Gini index as a level instrument. Tests: the Sargan tests the validity of instruments; high p-
values for the Sargan test fail to reject the null hypothesis and hence the instruments used are valid. m1 and m2 test respectively for first 
and second-order serial correlation in the error term. 
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Table 10. Health (Public and Private) Spending. 
Sources of Growth of Output, expressed as percentages 
 Capital Labour HEtot HEpu HEpr TFP 
All Countries       
Model (I) 47.09 6.02 16.44 --.-- --.-- 30.42 
Model (II) 47.65 5.83 --.-- 12.89 2.20 31.41 
Model (III) 47.77 5.80 --.-- 10.75 --.-- 35.66 
Model (IV) 49.36 5.96 --.-- --.-- 2.08 42.58 
Model (I) for countries:       
AUSTRALIA 41.94 7.56 13.53 --.-- --.-- 36.93 
AUSTRIA 46.50 7.08 17.67 --.-- --.-- 28.73 
CANADA 77.78 8.84 17.23 --.-- --.-- -3.86 
DENMARK 13.55 4.15 19.37 --.-- --.-- 60.91 
FINLAND 22.14 1.31 15.43 --.-- --.-- 61.11 
GERMANY 45.90 12.69 19.15 --.-- --.-- 22.25 
IRELAND 58.96 4.29 10.95 --.-- --.-- 25.78 
ITALY 33.58 1.73 15.18 --.-- --.-- 49.49 
JAPAN 61.92 4.87 15.80 --.-- --.-- 17.39 
LUXEMBOURG 45.89 5.91 10.79 --.-- --.-- 37.39 
NETHERLANDS 31.59 12.07 17.82 --.-- --.-- 38.50 
NEW ZEALAND 32.23 14.07 22.02 --.-- --.-- 31.65 
NORWAY 38.65 4.64 16.59 --.-- --.-- 40.11 
PORTUGAL 75.08 4.10 20.88 --.-- --.-- -0.08 
SPAIN 40.31 6.28 22.39 --.-- --.-- 31.00 
SWEDEN 26.13 1.44 16.84 --.-- --.-- 55.58 
UK 42.59 2.89 19.51 --.-- --.-- 34.98 
US 73.18 7.10 17.14 --.-- --.-- 2.56 
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Table 11. Health (Public and Private) and Public Education Spending. 
Sources of Growth of Output, expressed as percentages 
All Countries Capital Labour HEtot HEpub HEpr EDUpub TFP 
Model (I) 51.18 3.06 24.22 --.-- --.-- --.-- 21.52 
Model (II) 51.90 2.06 --.-- 17.01 0.63 --.-- 28.38 
Model (III) 48.49 3.20 27.30 --.-- --.-- 3.39 17.59 
Model (IV) 48.47 2.23 --.-- 22.18 --.-- 3.33 23.50 
Model (V) 49.51 1.87 --.-- 19.51 --.-- 3.31 25.77 
Note: In model (IV), the point estimate for private spending in health has been considered as 0 given 
that is not significant in the estimation 
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Appendix 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the main variables used 
Name Definition Source Mean St. Dev. 
∆lnYit Gross Domestic Product growth rate PWT 6.1 0.02867 0.02573 
∆lnKit Private capital stock growth rate PWT 6.1 and o.c. 0.01714 0.01518 
∆lnLit Employment growth rate PWT 6.1 0.01242 0.02350 
∆ln(HEtot)it Total health spending growth rate 
OECD Health 
Data 0.07731 0.04486 
∆ln(HEpu)it Public health spending growth rate 
OECD Health 
Data 0.07664 0.04932 
∆ln(HEpr)it Private health spending growth rate 
OECD Health 
Data 0.08126 0.06602 
∆ln(HEtot)it Total education spending growth rate 
WB and 
UNESCO 0.03399 0.05651 
∆ln(HEpu)it Public education spending growth rate 
WB and 
UNESCO 0.01522 0.11203 
∆ln(HEpr)it Private education spending growth rate 
WB and 
UNESCO 0.03967 0.69596 
GINI Gini Index Deininger and Squire (1996) 32.555 4.1081 
EXECRLC Dummy =1 if government is left-wing DPI2000 0.3941 --.-- 
MAJ Fraction of seats held by government DPI2000 0.5455 0.1001 
LEGELEC Dummy =1 if general election to be held in the year DPI2000 0.3095 --.-- 
CGTAX % of taxes collected by Central Gov’t OECD Revenue Statistics 0.5950 0.1558 
Notes: o. c.: own calculations. PWT 6.1: Penn World Tables Mark 6.1. WB: World Bank. Descriptive statistics 
for education spending are taken from World Bank data. DPI2000: Database of Political Institutions: Philip 
Keefer (2002), The Development Research Group World Bank. See notes on tables presenting regression results 
with each of the variables presented for details on countries and data spans. Statistics for macroeconomic 
variables are for countries and data spans for regressions including health spending variables. 
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